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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11266/6531

Title: Cost-Based Procurement Contracts with Ambiguity
Other Titles: 費用に基づいた調達契約に関する考察
Authors: Watabe, Masahiro
渡部, 真弘
Keywords: simple contracts
asymmetric information
Issue Date: 28-Jul-2017
Publisher: 立正大学経済学会
Abstract: Rogerson (2003, American Econonomic Review) considers a classical model of procurement under asymmetric information and predicts that a simple menu of contracts, a combination of a fixed price (FP) contract and a cost reimbursement (CR) contract, can capture a substantial share of the gains achieved by the fully optimal complex contract. His result suggests that the pure cost reimbursement contract cannot be optimal in his setting even though the use of the cost reimbursement contract is common in practice. It is shown that the performance of the optimal FPCR menu relative to the cost reimbursement contract relies on the existence of information ambiguity for the principal. Even for a small ambiguity, the optimal FPCR menu coincides with the pure cost reimbursement contract when the degree of information asymmetry between the principal and the agent is sufficiently high.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11266/6531
Appears in Collections:67巻1号

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